IOR/L/PS/10/905

• The plan by Mushir-ed-Dowleh [Ḥasan Pīrnīyā, Mushīr al-Dawlah] to form a cabinet, and address a telegram to Kuchik Khan [Mīrzā Kuchak Khān Jangalī] to submit to the central government
• The hesitance of Mushir-ed-Dowleh, possibly on the advice of the Shah [Aḥmad Shāh Qājār], not to form a government, due to perceived lack of support from the British
• The discontinuation of the monthly allowance to the Shah, the possible return of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh [Mīrzā Ḥasan Khān Vusūq al-Dawlah] as Prime Minister, the expenses incurred by the Shah in Europe, and the subsidy for maintaining the Cossack Division [Cossack Brigade]
• The inclusion by Mushir-ed-Dowleh of Mukhbar-es-Sultaneh [Mahdī Qulī Khān Hidāyat, Mukhbir al-Salṭanah] in the cabinet to obtain the support of nationalists
• The likelihood of a Bolshevik takeover if British forces at Meshed [Mashhad] were withdrawn, and the possibly ‘fatal’ danger to India of a Bolshevik presence in Khorasan
• The assurance that the British Government was prepared to give Mushir-ed-Dowleh a ‘fair trial’, and the latter’s consent to accept the Premiership based on that assumption
• The Jangali and Bolshevik takeover of the district of Tunekabun [Tonekabon], and the Persian Government’s proposal to ‘make use of Shahsevens [Shāhsivans] and people of Talish [Talesh]’, who are already armed and ‘anxious to attack Bolsheviks and Jangalis’
• The proposals of the Prime Minister of Persia, Mushir-ed-Dowleh, to dispatch a mission to Moscow to demand the ‘recall of Bolshevik troops’ and ‘cessation of propaganda’ in Persian territories, as well as a secret mission to religious authorities in Mesopotamia [Iraq], to persuade them to issue a fatwa condemning Bolshevism for being contrary to Islam
• The urgent instructions to General Hugh Frederick Champain at Menjil [Manjil] to cover not only Kasvin [Qazvin], but also Tehran against an invasion from the north, and if necessary cover the withdrawal of the Persian Government and European community southwards
• The tensions between the Shah and Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, the breakdown of the working relationship between them, and the fall of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh’s government
• The discussion between the British Minister in Tehran, Herman Norman, and Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, about the latter’s possible successors as Prime Minister, including Mushir-ed-Dowleh, Sipadar-Itapazan [Fatḥ Allāh Khān Akbar, Sipahdār-i A‘ẓam], and Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek [Mīrzā Ḥasan Khān Āshtīyānī, Mustawfī al-Mamalik]
• The Shah’s acceptance of Vossugh-ed-Dowleh’s resignation, and his summoning of Mushir-ed-Dowleh to form the new cabinet and government of Persia
• A meeting between Herman Norman and Prince Firuz [Fīrūz Mīrzā Fīrūz Nuṣrat al-Dawlah III] and the latter’s views on Mushir-ed-Dowleh and the Anglo-Persian Agreement
• The necessity of including a date of termination in the Anglo-Persian Agreement, the absence of which would ‘gravely prejudice’ its adoption by the Persian Parliament
• A discussion between Herman Norman and Mushir-ed-Dowleh about the possible inclusion of Motamin-ul-Mulk [Ḥusayn Pīrnīyā, Mu’tamin al-Mulk], Samsam Sultane [Najaf Qulī Khān Bakhtīyārī, Ṣamṣām al-Salṭanah], Amiri Mufakham [Luṭf ‘Alī Khān Bakhtīyārī, Amīr Mufakham], and Nosrat-ed-Dowleh [Nuṣrat al-Dawlah III] in the new government
• The recommendation by Herman Norman that Britain should come to terms with the Persian statesmen singled out to be punished for their conduct during the War, since they were ‘well looked upon by the people’ and hostility towards them would be counter-productive
• The determination of the British to single out the Persian statesmen Nizam-es-Sultaneh [Rizā Qulī Khān Nizām Māfī, Nizām al-Salṭanah], Mukhbar-es-Sultaneh, Mustaufi-ul-Mamalek, Mustashar-ed-Dowleh [Mīrzā Ṣādiq Khān Ṣādiq, Mustashār al-Dawlah] and Samsam for retribution on account of their ‘hostile actions’ against Britain during World War I
• The report on the ‘internal military problems in Persia at present’, including: ‘1. Disorder in Luristan, 2. Rebellion in Azerbaijan, 3. Rebellion of Kuchik Khan in Gilan and 4. Rebellion in Mazandaran’
• The ‘external military problems in Persia at present’, including the ‘Bolshevik menace in North and North East Persia’ and ‘possible Turkish or Bolshevik incursions into Persian Azerbaijan’
• A raid carried out by Persian Democrats on the Iskandari Press, discovery of a ‘large quantity of Bolshevik literature’, and ‘abundant proof’ linking it to the German Consul
• The definition of the role of Norperforce [North Persia Force] as a military ‘outpost’, intended to act as a deterrent against the Bolshevik naval forces currently stationed at Enzeli [Anzali]
• The initiation of a plan for Turkish forces in Anatolia to cross northern Persia, and collaborate with the Bolshevik Government of Baku in attacking Armenia
• The bombardment of Enzeli by Admiral Fyodor Raskolnikov, and the destruction of the remnants of General Anton Denikin’s fleet and the White Russian Navy
• The departure of Sultan Kazim Khan for Astara to establish communication with the Persian Government, and departure of Halil Pasha and Dr Fuad Sabit-Bek for Moscow
• The transfer of the Cossack Division, South Persia Rifles and Gendarmerie into the Regular Army of Persia and ‘disposal’ of General Starosselski [Vsevolod Staroselsky].’

The volume includes a divider which gives the subject number, the year the subject file was opened, the subject heading, and a list of correspondence references by year. This is placed at the back of the correspondence.