Mss Eur F699/1/1/1/28

Correspondence from Colonel John Jacob from Sind and Persia. Letters numbered 1-10 with index.

1. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Kurrachee, at midnight, 26 May 1856. Regrets that his proceedings should have fallen under the Governor General's censure. It is evident to Jacob that Lord Canning's letter was written under a misapprehension, owing possibly to Jacob's imperfect report of the facts of the case. Mentions his past services to Government. He assures the Governor General that the answer given to the messenger from Herat was the best which could have been given under the circumstances. Similar messages from Kandahar and Herat have been very frequent, there have been many adventurers, chiefly Russians, calling themselves British Agents, who go so far as to write letters in English as well as in Persian purporting to be replies to Jacob. The principal chiefs of Kandahar read and write English. Jacob has been in the habit of dealing at once with such communications, it would be a great mistake to treat them more seriously as matters requiring reference to Government He could never have brought the Sind border to peace had he not habitually acted with promptitude and decision. The statements in the letters from Herat were false, and the chief had already decided to surrender when they were written. Whatever British policy was to be, there was no time for a force to intervene effectively; so Jacob returned an answer as the reply of the local Government only which conveyed nothing but an expression of indifference, bound the Government to nothing whatever and showed the British contempt for their petty quarrels in Herat. Jacob believes that the proceedings in Persia and at Herat are the consequences of permitting the fall of Kars. No-one used to the Oriental mind could believe that the quarrel between Britain and Persia was for the reason assigned. But Kars having fallen, Russian powers appeared in the ascendant, and it became necessary to keep as far as possible on good terms with both Russia and Britain. The foolish personal quarrel with the English ambassador could be used to show the Russians the breach with England; or, should England prevail, the Persians could claim that they had always been friendly with England, but were only offended personally with the English representative. This affair all arises from the grave error of having detained Oomur Pacha and the Turkish Army in the Crimea when they might have been most useful in Armenia. But now that the British are on excellent terms with both Afghan powers, the events at Herat are unimportant, as it will be easy to move troops through Afghanistan, should this be necessary. The terms of the peace with Russia will presumably include the withdrawal of Russian troops from Kars and the old Turkish boundary, whereupon Persia will become submissive. Thanks Lord Canning for his kind expressions.

2. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Kurrachee, 30 Jun 1856. Acknowledges with thanks the Governor General's letter of 11 Jun. Apologises for any offence he may have given. Suggests that Persia might be attacked from the sea, at Bunder Abass and Busheer, from whence Kirman and Shiraz would be threatened. Bushire might be held until Herat was given up by Persia. From Shiraz, should it be necessary to continue the war, the heart of Persia is open via Ispahan. Suggests, as an easier way of attack, the establishment of a large permanent cantonment at Quetta. Suggests an improved road and a railway from the Bolan Pass to Sinde. The force would give complete control of all Afghanistan, without giving the least offence. The present so-called Belooche Battalions in Sinde should be disbanded, also the Hyderabad and Shikarpore Brigades, and the Sinde Police placed on a proper footing. Troops from Sinde and the Punjab might be moved forward to Quetta, and a body of the troops of the Khan of Kelat enlisted. The climate of Quetta is suitable for Europeans. The proposed garrison would have also commercial and financial advantages, by the encouragement of trade. Colonel Jacob has sent to the Supreme Government the original letters about Herat with further information obtained by Captain Merewether. The Kelat authorities are convinced that the Persians hold Herat.

3. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Kurrachee, 28 Jul 1856. Thanks Lord Canning for his letter of the 13th. He has long considered arrangements to secure the North West Frontier of India, and thinks that at the present India is like a mighty army without outposts of any kind. Discusses the two roads into India from the North West, by which it is possible for an army to march. One is through the Bolaun Pass, which is also the shortest road from Herat to British India. The other road is through the Khyber; this is protected by a strong Division at Peshawur. The road through the Bolaun should be protected by a force at Quetta. Suggests that the Afghans should not be subsidized until the British are established at Quetta; but thereafter Afghans could be enlisted as Irregulars. It is important to win the confidence of the Afghans by just and fair dealing, it will be necessary first to remove the impression left by the first British invasion of Afghanistan, which was both foolish and wicked. The British should command by high moral power alone, and not try to compete with the Afghans in cunning, as did poor Burnes and McNaughton. Russia might use the British occupation of Quetta as an excuse for advancing to Khiva Jacob thinks that if Russia does so peacefully, bringing with her European commerce and ideas, it would be to the advantage of all. If Russia tried to advance by violence, she would exasperate the whole people and her army would meet the fate of the British Army at Kabul. The Belooche Battalions should have been disbanded long ago, as repeatedly urged by Mr Frere. One paper annexed: Memorandum of proposed arrangements in case of a British Force being stationed at Quetta above the Bolaun Pass. Suggested rearrangements of troops, and arrangements for the Political Agency.

4. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Kurrachee, 11 Aug 1856. Acknowledges Lord Canning's letter of 26 Jul. He has not yet replied to the official despatch about Kelat, he thought he would first ascertain the views of the Khan of Kelat. The resources of the Kelat state are considerable, but the Government is very poor and the framework of Government was shaken by the British proceedings over Mehwab Khan and Shah Newaz. The great need of the Khan, is an able man to guide him. Jacob is convinced that an army of Persians under Russian guidance, could not be resisted by the people of Beloochistan without European direction. Jalk is close to the Kelat Frontier: the Frontier line is recognisable when it runs through inhabited country, but most of the country is sand without water and desolate hills. Noosky is the nearest place to the Frontier where the Khelan of Kelat has any troops. Jacob is trying to collect accurate information about the Persian Army. Remarks that the occupation of the Persian sea-ports however successful as a diversion will not suffice to protect the Indian Frontier from insult. The present pressure is evidently brought about by Persia, not alone, but guided by Russia. An attack on the sea-ports, or even a slow advance into the heart of Persia, would have little effect beside a rapid Persian advance on the North West Frontier whereby the Persians could take Kandahar, and menace the plains of India. Lahore or Delhi is more important to the British than Ispahan is to Persia. Repeats his proposals for the occupation of Quetta, which would save Beloochistan and Afghanistan from falling under Persian, that is to say Russian, influence. Jacob thinks that it would be most unwise to remove from the North West Frontier any men of the Sinde Irregular Horse for any purpose whatsoever, and suggests that the regular native cavalry of the Bombay Army would be admirable for the purpose required, i.e. the Expedition against Persia.

5. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Soopoora, 1 Nov 1856. Replies to Lord Canning's letter of 18 Oct. Lord Canning's objections to Jacob's scheme for the protection of the North West Frontier seem to have been suggested by someone whose experience of the country dates from before 1843. Great changes have taken place in the last 10 years. Suggests improving the road through the Bolaun Pass; this should be connected with a good road to Sind, and eventually a rail-road. Lord Canning is mistaken about the tribes in the frontier districts of Sind and Cutchee, they have long been quiet and peaceable. The country between the proposed camp at Quetta and Sind would be admirably governed for the British by the Kelat authorities. Jacob will send Lord Canning a copy of the Record Book of the Sind Irregular Horse. Criticises Napier's policy in maintaining a garrison in Kelat, supplied only by public stores. By acting on just principles, Jacob found no difficulties of supply; so that, while he had pulled down the fort of Khanghur, the town of Jacobabad sprung up simultaneously, a flourishing town with supplies sufficient for an army. Intended the troops at Quetta to be an irregular Field Force; regular troops, if necessary, could be sent up very rapidly. It would be simple to supply the Field Force with wheat and lucerne, sheep and cattle, from the surrounding valleys and from Cutchee. Provisions would have to be stored for the winter, though the cavalry could be moved down the Bolaun to Dadur. Believes that the establishment of the Field Force at Quetta would result in the growth of a large commercial town there. The cost of garrisoning Quetta would be trifling, and Jacob believes it to be necessary to maintain the present boundary of India. Jacob does not agree that the occupation of Quetta, if undertaken with the permission of the ruler of Kelat, would cause offence to the Afghans. He offers to make all the arrangements himself. Suggests one alteration to his memorandum submitted on 28 Jul, the separation of the Political and Military charges

6. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Soopoora, 1 Nov 1856. Thanks Lord Canning for his letter of 19 Oct. His official letters will have explained that he (Jacob) objected to the Collector of Shikarpur corresponding with the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab about arrangements to be made with the Kelat Government, which were outside the Collector's province, and about which the Collector had no correct information. Jacob did not object to the Chief Commissioner dealing direct with the Collector in an emergency. The convoy with arms and treasure for Dhost Mahomed is waiting at Dadur for news of an escort from Kandahar. Suggests Major Green to aid the Khan of Kelat, and to obtain information about the proceedings of the Persians on the frontier of Beloochistan.

7. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Jacobabad, 28 Dec 1856. Learns that he is ordered to join the army in Persia with one regiment of the Sind Irregular Horse. Sends a copy of a letter he has written to General Outram. Asks for Lord Canning's protection of Captain Merewether, who will remain in command and civil charge of the Frontier. Asks to be allowed to take to Persia Major Green and Captain Pelly; and asks that Merewether may be allowed to select an officer for political duty with the Khan of Kelat in place of Green. One paper annexed: copy of letter from Jacob to Outram, 28 Dec, Jacob wishes Outram had seen his correspondence with the Governor General about the Indian Frontier, for Jacob feels that the Government is about to commit enormous errors. The effects of such military expeditions as the present one against Persia will be merely temporary, enormously expensive, and will not secure the Frontier. If the Expedition is undertaken solely to punish Persia for insolence, well and good; but it will not succeed in securing India. Protests that the withdrawal of any part of the Sind Irregular Horse would be a grave error. Green (or Greer?) would be a better cavalry commander than Jacob; Jacob cares nothing for rank and honours but thanks Outram for his efforts on his behalf. Doubts the capacity of those in England who advance such puerile difficulties about the rank of officers, and the movement of troops into Afghanistan. Suggests arrangements for officers to accompany Jacob.

8. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Kurrachee, 20 Jan 1857. Thanks Lord Canning for a letter sent by General Outram who landed at Kurrachee for a few hours en route to Persia. Although Jacob thinks the Persian Expedition a great error, he will do his duty. He is very pleased with his appointment. Having consulted with Outram, Jacob learns that it is necessary for part of the Sind Irregular Horse to go to Persia; suggests that another regiment be raised. Jacob denies any connection with the pamphlet received by the Governor General from England.

9. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Kurrachee, 3 Mar 1857. Being about to embark for Persia and leave the Province where he has worked for nearly 19 years, thanks Lord Canning for all the favours and consideration he has been shown. Sends a copy of a letter he has written to Lord Elphinstone. Draws attention to the total destruction of a Persian Infantry regiment by Major Forbes with one troop of the 3rd Cavalry, which Jacob believes is an exploit unequalled in modern war. One paper annexed: copy of a letter from Jacob to Lord Elphinstone, 1 Mar 1857, detailing arrangements for the transport of the Sind Irregular Horse to Bushire. Believes that it is very important that there should be river steamers for the Euphrates and Karoon. Only three are to go by order of Sir H Leeke, one of these will not be ready for 10 days, and no crews have been sent up for the others. Jacob will despatch as many river steamers as possible, asks for approval. Some European seamen are needed. Forage is short at Bushire, Jacob is sending hay. Major Hill's report is discouraging, but may be inaccurate regarding the valley of the Karoon. Jacob does not think it a good plan to make a rush into the interior of Persia in the hope of frightening the Shah into submission. Russia would advise Persia of the insecurity of the British position. Recommends the occupation of the whole maritime Provinces between the mountains and the sea, from the Euphrates to Bunder Abass, in perpetuity. This would secure the line of communication with Europe without being dependent upon Egypt; it would also serve as a base to march into Georgia, should the war with Russia be renewed. On seeing such intentions, Russia would advise the Shah to submit to any terms whatever. Thanks Lord Elphinstone for agreeing to his request about Lieutenant Thatcher and Captain Merewether;

10. Letter from Colonel J Jacob, Bushire, 2 Apr 1857. Sends a copy of a letter addressed to Sir James Outram. With reference to the proposed operations against the Persians, the enemy are encamped close to the hills, at the entrance of the Haf Moollah pass. One paper annexed: copy of a letter from Jacob to Sir James Outram, 1 Apr, 'The Bombay' with Lord Dunkellin and Outram's letters and despatches is sailing. There is a great shortage of coal at Bushire, details arrangements made to remedy this. Believes that the proposed reinforcements should be sent without delay, except the 14th Dragoons which should be sent to Kurrachee. European cavalry are worse than useless in Persia. Materials for temporary barracks and huts should be sent from Bombay and Kurrachee at once, also tools, carpenters and smiths, and provisions. The enemy at the foot of the hills at Nanazeh should be attacked and the plain cleared. At present Jacob is not strong enough to attempt anything against the enemy, suggests that Outram joins him with as many men as can be spared from the Karoon line. Discusses arrangements about ships.