IOR/L/PS/10/687/1

This part contains papers relating to the financing, by the British Government, of the Imperial Russian Army in Persia [Iran], notably difficulties concerning the acquisition of currency for the payment of troops, and the development of British policy regarding the method of distribution of funds to the Russian military authorities in Persia. The papers notably cover:

• Problems with: purchasing roubles [rubles] in Russia due to restrictions on agents of the Imperial Bank of Persia in Russia; the remittance of roubles through Persia; and the poor rouble exchange rate due to the depreciated value of the currency
• ‘Lawless’ behaviour of Russian troops in Persia, notably at Hamadan, Kermanshah and Kasvin [Qazvin], including looting of bazaars, apparently following the refusal of marketeers to accept the depreciated rouble
• Problems of the Russian military authorities, notably the ‘Caucasian Army’ [Russian Caucasus Army] under General Baratoff [Nikolai Nikolaevich Baratov], in obtaining funds from the Russian Government, and requests for British financial support and loans
• British concerns that the departure of Russian troops would leave Persia vulnerable to attack by Turkish [Ottoman] forces, and plans to send a British force to the region
• The need of the British Government and the Government of India to balance financial pressures in Persia with those of the war effort elsewhere
• Plans for the acquisition of silver by Russia from America, and its transfer to Petrograd [St Petersburg] for minting of Persian money (Krans) and onward transmission to Persia, or for transfer to Teheran [Tehran], via Petrograd, for minting in Persia, to meet the requirements of the Russian troops (see also IOR/L/PS/10/687/2)
• British decision to set up a Commission, or Board, in Hamadan, for the control and distribution of Krans to finance and pay Russian troops in Persia (rather than distribute funds via a Russian Bank or directly to the Russian military authorities), and difficulties over recruiting staff who are both sufficiently experienced and available (see also IOR/L/PS/10/687/2)
• Growing British doubts in late 1917 about the reliability of Baratoff’s army and the policy of continuing to finance it, notably the War Office’s view that it is out of control, under the influence of Bolshevik committees, and at risk of being utilised against British interests.

The papers mostly consist of: covering letters of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Under-Secretary of State for India, with related enclosures; minute papers of the India Office Secret and Political departments; copies of decyphered telegrams; copies of correspondence; notes and letters by India Office officials. The India Office minute papers are annotated chiefly by John Evelyn Shuckburgh, Secretary, Political and Secret Department, and Francis H Lucas, Secretary, Financial Department.

The main correspondents are as follows: the Foreign Office; the India Office, including various Financial Department officials; Sir Charles Marling, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Teheran; George Newell, Manager, Imperial Bank of Persia, London; Monsieur S Ermolaieff [Yermolayev?], Agent of the Imperial Russian Treasury, India House, London; and M Nabokoff [Konstantine Dmitrivitch Nabokov], Chargé d’Affaires of the Russian Government in London. Other correspondents include: Sir Cecil Spring Rice, British Ambassador to the United States, Washington (also a former Ambassador to Persia [Iran] 1906-1908), and Sir George William Buchanan, British Ambassador to the Russian Empire (up to the October Revolution), Petrograd [St Petersburg].