IOR/L/PS/10/687/2

This part contains papers relating to the financing, by the British Government, of the Imperial Russian Army in Persia [Iran], particularly the difficulties in the acquisition of currency to pay troops, and policy developments concerning the role of Russian forces in Britain’s military and political strategy. The papers notably cover:

• The crisis in the rouble [ruble] exchange rate and authorisation of payments to the Russian Army of the Caucasus in local currency (Krans), due to the scarcity, unpopularity and devaluation of the rouble
• Discussion concerning whether the silver being imported by Russia from America (see IOR/L/PS/10/687/1) should be transferred directly to the British Government, instead of Russia, and the British Government advance funds to Russia for the purchase of Krans
• Tension between the Treasury and the War Office and Foreign Office regarding how much resource is allocated for the Russian Army in Persia, especially in light of armistice negotiations by the new Russian Government with Turkey [Ottoman Empire] towards the end of 1917
• Foreign Office enquiries concerning the possibility of the Indian Government dispatching silver bullion to the Imperial Bank of Persia, Teheran [Tehran], and the potential minting facilities in Bombay [Mumbai] in the event of Teheran refusing to mint silver Krans
• The composition and reporting structure of the Hamadan Board, set up to control British financing of Russian troops, and its dissolution after the arrival of Dunsterforce [Allied military force under General Lionel Dunsterville] in June 1918
• Financing of the Persian Cossack Division (under Russian command), by the British Government, and proposals in March 1918 to move the Meshed [Mashhad] detachment to Shahrud [Shahrood] in closer proximity to Teheran for the city's defence (if needed), whilst waiting for British forces to arrive
• The question of whether to continue or to stop paying the Russian troops in north west Persia, notably at Resht [Rasht] and Enzeli [Bandar-e Anzali], and the various considerations including: payments might end the reported looting of local banks by Russian troops; doubts about the potential effectiveness of Bicharakoff’s force [Colonel Lazar Bicherakov, also spelled Bicharakov in this item] to secure and advance British military interests, notably to prevent the capture of Kazvin [Qazvin] and possibly Teheran by the (anti-Qajar) Jangalis [Jungle Movement of Gilan]; the continued difficulties in obtaining Krans to finance the Russian forces and how much to pay them in relation to the claims submitted by Russian military authorities; whether payment of the remaining Russian forces should be contingent on Bicharakoff co-operating with Dunsterforce
• Whether, and how much, to pay the retrospective claims of General Baratoff [Nikolai Nikolaevich Baratov] for his disbanded force [the 1st Caucasus Cossack Corps, disbanded after the Russian ‘October Revolution’ 1917].

The papers mostly consist of minute papers of the India Office Secret and Political departments; copies of decyphered telegrams; copies of correspondence; and notes and letters by India Office officials. The India Office minute papers are annotated chiefly by John Evelyn Shuckburgh, Secretary, Political and Secret Department, and officials of the Financial Department.

The main correspondents are as follows: the India Office, including various Financial Department officials; the Treasury; the Foreign Office; Sir Charles Marling, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Teheran [Tehran]; General Officer Commanding in Charge, Mesopotamia; and the Director of Military Intelligence.