Mss Eur F213/23, p87

Punjab situation: Mulraj sending agents everywhere to raise troops; appeal being made to Sikh religion; he probably has 10,000 troops rather than 50,000 reported in newspapers; Sikh Durbar troops entirely unreliable and may join Mulraj; Lt (later Sir Herbert) Edwardes (Assistant Political Agent at Bannu) reports disaffection among his Sikh troops and can rely only on Pathan levies he has been raising since insurrection; ruler of Bahawalpur reported to be moving against Mulraj at Multan, but if he does not, position of Edwardes and Col Van Cortlandt (commanding Sikh troops in that vicinity) could become critical; approves summary justice exercised by Currie on two conspirators, one a vakil of Maharani (Ranjit Singh's widow); anticipated Dalhousie's wishes in removing Maharani from care of Sikh Durbar at Lahore to custody in British territory at Benares; abundant evidence from vakil and others implicating her in conspiracy; reinforcements sent to Lahore and other precautionary troop movements; Gough has ordered Indus steamer to be brought up to Ferozepore to assist communications when river becomes swollen; lists troops available in Bari Doab at Lahore (11,740) and Jullundur Doab (9,430) which are more than sufficient to maintain themselves against Khalsa troops, and Ghulab Singh (Maharaja of Kashmir) though latter shows no sign of defecting; Maharaja of Patiala has offered every assistance; Dalhousie has 'no alarm whatever as to our position', but a number of particular anxieties including fears that 'very extended operations may become necessary, 'and that we may be compelled to take Punjab, whether we will or not', or that it will difficult to secure adequate 'reparation, reimbursement and punishment'; defends at length, and takes responsibility for, C-in-C's decision not to move British troops against Multan at once; postponement of operations the least bad option; considers army proposed by Gough when offensive operations do begin much larger than necessary; also disapproves his recommendation to restore Bengal Army to its former strength; strongly disapproves Edwardes's having entered into negotiations with Mulraj (though Currie approved); 'nothing but unconditional surrender' should be listened to from 'a murderer and a rebel'; too much readiness in India to negotiate which he means to check; congratulates Home Govt on withstanding threatened violence on 10 April [at the Chartist demonstration] and in Ireland, and urges that continuing strong line 'will be a winning game for for the true interests of the Empire, whatever it may be for party'; is feeling better but 'this climate takes it out of a man'.

3 June: Edwardes's report that Mulraj had not crossed Indus on 18 May. And rivers were swelling.